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INSTITUTIONAL AND RESOURCE-BASED EXPLANATIONS FOR SUBSIDIARY 
PERFORMANCE 
 
ABSTRACT 
Addressing calls to integrate insights from institutional theory and the resource-based view, 
we bring together dual theoretical explanations from institutional theory and the resource-
based view to examine the effectiveness of transfer of practice and human capital 
development as two routes to subsidiary performance. Our study of Hong Kong firms with 
subsidiaries in Mainland China shows that both routes positively affect subsidiary 
performance. However, our data shows that our sampled firms struggled to successfully 
transfer practices from their parents. We attribute an explanation for this to the characteristics 
of practices as organizational capabilities in which transfer is made harder by the difficulty in 
replicating such capabilities. Consequently, developing subsidiary human capital is an 
important ally to practice transfer as a means to achieve superior subsidiary performance. Our 
results raise interesting questions about practice transfer and the resource-based view relevant 
to future scholarly research. 
 
Keywords: Transfer of practice, human capital, institutional theory, resource-based view. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Studies tend towards competing accounts of subsidiary performance, typically grounded in 
institutional explanations of the successful transfer of parent practices for internal legitimacy 
(Chan and Makino, 2007; Kostova and Roth, 2002) or otherwise the development of new or 
alternative practices for external legitimacy (Lu and Xu, 2006).2 But from a resource-based 
view (RBV), parent firms may persist with the transfer of established organizational practices 
to draw on resource-based advantages to generate more defendable returns to its subsidiary 
(Mellahi et al., 2013). The transfer of practice may then indicate that parents seek to 
capitalize on their reservoir of rare, valuable and difficult-to-imitate advantages to increase 
subsidiary performance (Dunning, 1988; He, Brouthers and Filatotchev, 2013; Peng, 2001), 
which points to a resource-based explanation for what otherwise appears to be internal 
legitimation behaviour (Mellahi et al., 2013).  
 Alternatively, the subsidiary may develop novel practices towards the same end and 
for external legitimation. For a subsidiary to create new practices, it must invest in its human 
capital resources (Björkman and Budhwar, 2007; Peng, 2001) as human capital function as 
(micro)foundations for new routines and capabilities (Felin, Foss, Heimeriks and Madsen, 
2012). While this is rooted in the RBV and the human capital literature (Coff and Kryscynski, 
2011), it has connections to institutional theory. Developing human capital strength can 
counter against the tendency for institutionalized practices to crowd out the search for new 
alternatives (Yang and Konrad, 2011), which can weaken subsidiary performance (Rugman 
and Verbeke, 2001). Given these differences, to what extent do transfer of practices and 
                                                 
2 Studies typically focus on ‘foreign’ subsidiaries but the challenge they face is rooted in institutional variation, 
and such institutional variations can perpetuate among regions as well as within and across boundaries. For 
example, “Certainly… there are substantial differences in corporate and managerial behaviour between 
Mainland China and [Hong Kong]… As ‘same culture, different system’ examples like Mainland China and 
Hong Kong illustrate, the impact of institutional differences is sufficient for Hong Kong managers to regard 
managing operations in the Mainland as problematic” (Child and Warner, 2003, pp.24-25). Child and Warner 
(2003) cite many others who share their conclusion that regional differences are great among Hong Kong and 
Mainland China. Indeed, these remain challenging (Li, Karande and Zhou, 2009; McKirdy, 2014). Thus, the 
reader may wish to think of the subsidiaries in our study as being distant or regional in that respect, in which the 
object of interest is the institutional variation they face―not too dissimilar to the idea of a foreign subsidiary. 
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development of human capital strength explain subsidiary performance? 
 Focusing on this key question, we argue that both institutional theory and the RBV 
provide theoretical explanations for both the transfer of practices and the development of 
human capital as routes to subsidiary performance. We advocate an integrative perspective 
because the pressure of institutional duality (Kostova and Roth, 2002) reduces organizational 
activity to a response-driven problem, downplaying the value creation aspect of transfer of 
practice versus human capital development activity. The RBV instead posits that 
multinational corporations (MNCs) and their subsidiaries can create value by leveraging 
existing resources or developing new ones to generate resource-based advantages (Brouthers, 
Brouthers and Werner, 2008).  
 The literature integrating insights from institutional and RBV perspectives is thin 
despite repeated calls from international business and strategy scholars (He et al., 2013; 
Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumki and Peng, 2009; Oliver, 1997; Peng, 2001, 2003; Wright, 
Filatotchev, Hoskisson and Peng, 2005). Addressing this problem is valuable because 
integrating insights from both perspectives can yield new insights neither alone could offer. 
For example, transferring practices for internal legitimacy sacrifices novelty on the 
assumption that practices transfer in complete ways that replicate the original resource. 
Transfer success is then fundamental if value is to follow. But developing subsidiary-level 
human capital offers opportunities to shape new practices best suited to the context of the 
subsidiary, such that its strength may also yield important returns to performance. We do not 
purport to integrate both institutional theory and the RBV perspectives into one position or 
theory. Rather, we believe that drawing explanations from both theories for an integration of 
insights offers a better way to understand the phenomena of interest. 
This study contributes to the important body of research that seeks to untangle 
predictions of resource-based and institutional perspectives on subsidiary performance. We 
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make two important contributions. First, theorizing an integration of insights from 
institutional and resource-based explanations leads us to suspect a competition in how 
corporations approach subsidiary performance. For example, while a successful transfer of 
practice might increase internal legitimacy and leverage what the MNC parent sees as ‘core’ 
practices, novel advantages are more likely to emerge from human capital investments 
(Andersson, Björkman and Forsgren, 2005). We offer a model to address this concern by 
demonstrating dual institutional and resource-based reasons for practice transfer and human 
capital routes to subsidiary performance. Bringing together legitimacy-seeking and 
advantage-seeking behaviour in this manner offers an alternative to traditional 
conceptualizations of the phenomena under investigation. Second, we offer an empirical 
model that unpacks the contribution of human capital to subsidiary performance. The human 
capital of the subsidiary is important for establishing and enacting new practices in pursuit of 
subsidiary performance, but also offers a direct basis for subsidiary performance by serving 
as critical resources capable of generating rare advantages and difficult-to-imitate rents (Coff, 
1997). This adds new knowledge to how beneficial resource-based advantages may come 
about within subsidiaries (Brouthers et al., 2008).  
The paper now moves to establish the theoretical background for the work. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Institutional Theory, the Resource-based View, and Subsidiary Performance 
Institutional theory places emphasis on the normative contexts within which subsidiaries exist 
(Björkman, Fey and Park, 2007). An understanding of the subsidiary’s internal and external 
contexts is then needed to appreciate what actions it ‘must’ take to enable subsidiary 
performance. The source of greatest institutional pressure (Kostova and Roth, 2002) then 
creates coercive and mimetic pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) to adopt practices 
deemed legitimate by the source of that pressure. A subsidiary’s actions are then a response 
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to institutional pressure. 
For a subsidiary, considerable pressure flows from the parent to adopt its best 
practices, ‘tried-and-tested’ over time (Chang, Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2009). Such 
institutional pressure can lead the subsidiary to harmonize practices with the parent (Kostova 
and Roth, 2002). The adoption of parent practices provides internal legitimacy for the 
subsidiary with its corporate parent, rendering its subsequent actions to be ‘accepted’ or 
‘approved’ (Kostova, Roth and Dacin, 2008), lowering its transaction costs (Martinez and 
Dacin, 1999). However, this assumes that a successful transfer is achieved.3 
The subsidiary may also come under external institutional pressure to generate new 
practices that align with its local institutional context (Kostova et al., 2008). But the literature 
on national business systems (Whitley, 1999) suggests that this pressure is two-fold. 
Dominant practices set in the MNC parent are shaped by its home business context. These 
face competing pressures to adapt if applied to a subsidiary in a different business system and 
institutional context (Edwards and Kuruvilla, 2005). Some of the MNC’s practices may not 
be appropriate for local contexts (Jensen and Szulanski, 2004). External legitimacy pressure 
can then come from deficits in applying corporate practices in circumstances for which they 
were not intended. This raises a resource-based argument. While the transfer of practices 
from the MNC parent is an important means by which the shortage of capabilities can be 
overcome, their imposition in a different institutional setting is potential damaging (Child, 
Chung and Davies, 2003). 
Valuable practices attractive for transfer are conceived as capabilities (Szulanski, 
1996) and the existence of capabilities within firms is one of the principles of the RBV 
(Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). The RBV carries the assumption that the competitive advantage of 
                                                 
3 Jensen and Szulanski (2004) put forward ‘stickiness’ to describe transfer difficulty but presented it as a feature 
calling for practice adaptation. If a practice was part transferred or during the process of transfer required 
significant local adaptation, the transfer could not be classed as a success from an internal legitimation 
perspective because its form would no longer resemble that of the parent but instead one more aligned with the 
external institutional context. 
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a MNC is contingent on its ability to deploy its existing organizational practices/capabilities 
or develop new ones (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1988; Kostova and Roth, 2002). This motivates 
the MNC parent to transfer capabilities to its subsidiary in an extension of the internalization 
logic (Teece, 2014). But Birkinshaw (1996) observed that “the engine of subsidiary growth is 
its distinctive capabilities” (p.467, emphasis added), arguing that anything to the contrary 
renders a subsidiary uncompetitive. Unlike institutional theory, the RBV places emphasis on 
organizational heterogeneity for superior performance (Barney and Clark, 2007). Instead of 
responding to pressurizing institutional stimuli, the subsidiary takes a value creation approach 
to seek superior performance by generating its own unique resource-based advantages 
(Brouthers et al., 2008). This trades an assumption of replication for one that values novelty.  
Human capital resources help subsidiaries conceive and implement new practices 
(Yang and Konrad, 2011). Human resources generate tacit knowledge in the course of their 
activities that innovate new routines capable of becoming their own practices and capabilities 
in time (Felin et al., 2012; Winter, 2000, 2003). For example, Mäkelä, Sumelius, Hӧglund 
and Ahlvik (2012) found the experience of HR managers to affect the emergence of HR 
capabilities in MNC subsidiaries. Developing human capital strength can then counter the 
tendency for institutionalized practices to crowd out the search for new ways of doing 
business (Yang and Konrad, 2011). Failure to do so can weaken subsidiary performance 
(Birkinshaw, 1996; Rugman and Verbeke, 2001). 
While the RBV could be seen as more naturally supporting the development of novel 
practices by the subsidiary, Björkman and Lervik (2007) argue that MNC parent practices 
can also be viewed as valuable resources that should be replicated at the subsidiary to 
enhance subsidiary performance. Replicating practices that are ‘known’ (to the parent) to 
perform in superior ways (Szulanski, 1996) is attractive and practice transfer requires the 
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replication of routines underpinning the capability the practice reflects (Winter, 2003).4 Both 
institutional theory and the RBV therefore provide arguments to support the transfer of 
practices and human capital development as routes to subsidiary performance. We now move 
to hypothesize the expected relationships within these pathways. 
Transfer of Practice and Performance 
The adoption of parent practices by a subsidiary is driven by ‘institutional duality’ (Kostova 
and Roth, 2002). Historically, this was thought to be driven by external institutional pressure 
to legitimize itself in its new host context by adopting local practices or adapting its existing 
ones; but an alternative view is that the subsidiary faces a dual internal institutional pressure 
to accept the transfer of organizational ‘best’ practices from the MNC parent (Chang et al., 
2009; Mellahi et al., 2013).  
Institutional explanations propose that the transfer of practice offers the subsidiary 
legitimacy in the eyes of the parent (Kostova et al., 2008; Mellahi et al., 2013) through its 
conformance with organizational best practices. The institutional perspective then sees the 
transfer of practice as being driven by a desire to emulate the practices of this relevant peer to 
establish the internal legitimacy of the venture. This logic is consistent with the idea of 
external institutional pressures acting on subsidiaries to adopt local practices, merely that its 
direction is in the opposite (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  
In recognizing an institutional pressure from within the MNC, Kostova and Roth 
(2002) and Björkman and Lervik (2007) evoke a resource-based logic for maintaining and 
extending corporate practices into subsidiaries. Organizational practices can resemble 
valuable firm-specific resources when the routines that underpin them are established over 
                                                 
4 Capabilities are described as a combination of resources, routines and accompanying knowledge that enable an 
organization to perform operational activities such as operating, marketing, accounting, HR, sales or 
manufacturing in superior ways (Teece, 2014; Winter, 2003). These are sometimes termed ‘ordinary’, 
‘substantive’ or ‘operational’ capabilities in an effort to distinguish them from ‘dynamic’ capabilities. Dynamic 
capabilities often rely on these ordinary or substantive capabilities (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Winter, 2003). 
Dynamic capabilities are outside the scope of this paper. 
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time, have evolved explicitly through refinement efforts and tacitly through organizational 
learning, and become a difficult-to-imitate, effective organizational capability (Helfat and 
Winter, 2011; Winter, 2003). In such instances, parents may seek to replicate these valuable 
resources into its subsidiary as a basis for superior subsidiary performance (Szulanski, 1996). 
A resource-based perspective then sees the transfer of practice as a means of capitalizing on 
firm-specific advantages owing to their rarity and relative inimitability outside the firm 
(Barney, 1991; Barney and Clark, 2007).  
The mere transfer of practice from the parent is not sufficient to improve the 
performance of the subsidiary. From an institutional theory (institutional duality) and 
resource-based perspective, the transfer of practice from a parent to its subsidiary is intended 
to duplicate the practices of the parent to as near a facsimile as possible. As the practice is 
well-tried as a capability in its experience (RBV), its duplication in the subsidiary makes its 
activities legitimate and reliable in the eyes of the MNC parent (internal legitimacy) (Chang 
et al., 2009; Mellahi et al., 2013) and further garners its corporate support (Kostova and Roth, 
2002).  
Transfer success is relative and not binary. Unsuccessful transfer risks compromising 
the value of the practice because the routines and tacit knowledge underpinning the practice 
(Winter, 2000) may have transferred incompletely (Jensen and Szulanski, 2004). Institutional 
theory ignores the complexity of this transfer although the RBV itself neither speaks 
sufficiently to this problem. Barney (1991) spoke of ‘imperfect imitability’ as a characteristic 
of valuable resources but in doing so raised the very prospect of low success transfer. Barney 
(1991) suggests that firm resources and capabilities can be “imperfectly imitable for one or a 
combination of three reasons: (a) the ability of a firm to obtain a resource is dependent upon 
unique historical conditions, (b) the link between the resources possessed by a firm and a 
firm’s sustained competitive advantage is causally ambiguous, or (c) the resource generating 
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a firm’s advantage is socially complex” (p.107).5 These problems are exacerbated when the 
transfer of practice is patchy and ceremonial instead of strategic (Kostova and Roth, 2002), 
burdening the subsidiary with practices not suitable to its external institutional context (Child 
et al., 2003), compromising its external institutional legitimacy. This is the case with non-
location-bound firm-specific advantages where the value of such practices is “very limited 
(or even absent altogether) if not connected with complementary assets, external linkages and 
learning capabilities in the subsidiaries” (Rugman and Verbeke, 2003, p.129).  
We expect that practice transfer is an important route to subsidiary performance but 
we expect transfer success to define the performance rewards of practice transfer activity 
initiated by the parent. Only then might we expect that a sufficient amount of the routines and 
tacit knowledge underpinning a practice have been replicated. Thus: 
Hypothesis 1: The successful transfer of practices from the parent improves 
subsidiary performance. 
 
A subsidiary is not an independent entity―if a practice is mandated by the parent, the 
subsidiary is obligated to comply (Kostova and Roth, 2002). The successful transfer of 
practice from the parent to its subsidiary depends on the extent to which the subsidiary enacts 
the prescriptions laid out by the parent (Björkman and Lervik, 2007). The transfer of practice 
may otherwise only be partial. For example, Szulanski (1996) observed that the process of 
practice transfer is often only a partial replication of the greater web of relationships among 
routines and capabilities. Rugman and Verbeke (2003) underscored the significance of 
location-bound firm-specific advantages, and immobile bundle of complementary practices in 
limiting the value of transferred practices. Central to this problem is that capabilities consist 
                                                 
5 Should a practice be adapted in the course of transfer in a way that distances it as a facsimile of the parent’s, 
this would compete against the institutional pressure (duality) the parent exerts. As a result, the practice is not 
then a duplication of that of the parent’s and would be seen as an unsuccessful transfer (theoretically) in its eyes. 
Moreover, if adapted, its properties as a valuable resource are potential lost or at least compromised. 
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of routines that are founded in part in tacit knowledge (Winter, 2000, 2003). Organizations 
may overcome this by transferring several practices together but even then routines are 
subject to a degree of flexibility and change (Feldman and Pentland, 2003), and perhaps 
necessarily so (Jensen and Szulanski, 2004) to achieve external legitimacy. Organizational 
control placed on the subsidiary by the parent provides the means to monitor the transfer of 
practice. 
In viewing the transfer of practice in resource terms, practices consist of not only 
routines that must be transferred, but also tacit knowledge on its use and application. Tacit 
knowledge is harder to imitate and transfer than routines. The successful transfer of practice 
is then likely to depend on the extent to which subsidiaries are controlled effectively by the 
parent (Harzing, 1999) and the appropriateness of the forms of organizational control put in 
place (Grant, 1996). Organizational controls are normally an internal institutional response to 
ensure the subsidiary conforms to the wishes of the parent, rendering its actions legitimate 
and worthy of its continued support (Chan and Makino, 2007; Kostova and Roth, 2002). A 
practice might then be implemented successfully through performance management policies, 
including setting performance targets and the use of performance-based rewards and 
appraisal (Mellahi, Frynas and Collings, 2015). From a RBV then, such organizational 
control is necessary to ensure accuracy in the transfer of valuable routines that underpin a 
practice (Szulanski, 1996), and coordinate the transfer of knowledge about the practice to its 
subsidiary (Björkman, Barner-Rasmussen and Li, 2004).  
Organizational controls reflect the extent to which the parent firm uses various formal 
and informal methods to direct the actions of subsidiary managers and employees. 
Institutionally, procedures, norms and rules incentivize and provide strategic direction. But 
organizational controls also serve an important resource-based purpose to inform how a 
practice might be implemented. For example, Bjӧrkman et al. (2004) and Mellahi et al. 
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(2015) found evidence that the use of headquarter control can influence inter-unit knowledge 
transfer. Sufficient organizational controls appear to be a perquisite to the successful transfer 
of practices from the parent to its subsidiary. Thus: 
Hypothesis 2: Organizational controls put in place by the parent are positively 
related to the successful transfer of practices within the subsidiary. 
Human Capital and Performance 
A tension the parent corporation faces in transferring practices is the mimetic and isomorphic 
tendencies of internal institutionalization (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Martinez and Dacin, 
1999) versus the need to conceive and implement practices tailored to the market context of 
the subsidiary (Barney and Clark, 2007), enabling it to go beyond competitive parity as 
prescribed by the RBV. The transfer and institutionalization of practices can erect barriers to 
the development of new approaches to business activity (Yang and Konrad, 2011), and 
impede the formation of new alternatives bespoke to the context, which might weaken 
subsidiary performance (Rugman and Verbeke, 2001). However, the attributes of the 
subsidiary’s resource base can compensate for this institutional hazard, and assert the benefits 
of its current practices while encouraging the development of new ones (Björkman and 
Lervik, 2007; Child et al., 2003; Yang and Konrad, 2011). To conceive and implement new 
ways of doing things, an investment in human capital is required. 
Human capital represents the knowledge, information, ideas and skills of individuals 
and yields a unique asset capable of generating rents for the firm (Becker, 1964). At the unit 
level, human capital can be defined as the aggregate of individual human capital within the 
subsidiary, the strength of which is defined by the knowledge, skill and experience possessed 
by those in the subsidiary (Wright and McMahan, 2011).  
Subsidiaries recruit local talent to acquire human capital suitable for its market 
context, aiding its external legitimacy (Mellahi et al., 2013). They are sometimes forced to do 
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so by the policies of the local government. For example, the Chinese government often 
requires MNCs to share their technologies with state-owned enterprises as a condition of 
operating in the country, and to hire and develop local employees and managers in turn 
(Frynas et al., 2006; Hout and Ghemawat, 2010; Sun et al., 2010). This institutional pressure 
can undermine a subsidiary as its human capital profile becomes driven by external 
legitimization instead of its resource needs.  
From an institutional theory perspective, relying on human capital strength might 
simply be a suboptimal response to pressures for external legitimacy. But the RBV offers an 
extended explanation why human capital strength can instead drive unique performance 
advantages. For a subsidiary to create new practices, it must possess strong human capital 
resource (Björkman and Budhwar, 2007; Peng, 2001) to spearhead a search for new 
alternatives when facing internal institutional pressure to conform (Yang and Konrad, 2011), 
which is valuable to subsidiary performance (Rugman and Verbeke, 2001). When the parent 
trusts in the human capital strength of its subsidiary, it may loosen its own institutional 
constrains for maintaining corporate support. For example, empirical evidence has associated 
human capital with more effective strategic choices (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996), 
effective strategy implementation (Miller and Lee, 2001) and desirable firm outcomes 
(Pfeffer, 1994). Establishing human capital strength might offer another route to subsidiary 
performance. Thus: 
Hypothesis 3: Human capital strength is positively related to subsidiary performance. 
Employees are crucial to a process of learning within subsidiaries. The human capital 
of the subsidiary can then shape the flow of knowledge about how routines put in place are 
made to work, or from which new routines might emerge (Saka-Helmhout, 2007). For 
example, based on institutional theory, the transfer of practice is geared towards 
institutionalizing organizational practices that become rule-like in nature (Martinez and 
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Dacin, 1999) and ingraining ways to do things seen as legitimate by internal stakeholders 
(Kostova et al., 2008). But studies suggest that subsidiary performance can be compromised 
when practices are merely ‘adopted’ but not actually ‘in use’ (Kostova et al., 2008), and 
Child et al. (2003) warn of the dangers of imposing practices into a subsidiary that operates in 
an unfamiliar institutional environment to its parent. A subsidiary must then look to augment 
its human capital strength. 
Human capital availability and investing in human capital development is intuitively a 
resource-based problem. However, attracting local talent to MNCs’ subsidiaries has 
institutional components. For example, until recently, MNCs and their subsidiaries found it 
relatively easy to recruit local talent when entering China (Schmidt, 2011). But this has 
changed markedly with MNCs no longer the destination of choice for Chinese graduates as 
local/domestic firms professionalize and globalize their activities, offering more senior roles 
and better promotion prospects (Dewhurst, Pettigrew and Srinivasan, 2012; Schmidt, 2011). 
This does not mean that outsider firms have ‘bad’ reputations; rather, the opportunities in 
local/domestic firms are increasingly more attractive making the recruitment landscape 
harder. From an institutional standpoint, attracting and investing in human capital is 
necessary to establish the external legitimacy the subsidiary needs to operate in the external 
environment, irrespective of the institutional duality to prioritise parent-preferred practices. 
Those subsidiaries able to increase the availability of human capital and then invest in their 
development once acquired are better placed to build human capital strength. 
There are resource-based advantages to this external institutional pressure, however. 
For example, the literature on absorptive capacity denotes that resources held by the 
receiving firm are important to its ability to capitalize on new practices and establish new 
routes to performance (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). An absence of quality human capital has 
the effect of inhibiting performance. In contrast, attracting and developing human capital 
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increases their firm-specific attributes to become valuable, rare and inimitable resources in 
their own right, capable of innovating new practices (Yang and Konrad, 2011). The 
intangible and socially-complex nature of human capital (Coff, 1997) contributes to 
organizational heterogeneity and its inimitability increases as it becomes more specific to the 
context in which it is located (Becker, 1993) and developed (Lepak and Snell, 1999). Thus: 
Hypothesis 4: The availability of human capital for the subsidiary is positively related 
to human capital strength. 
Hypothesis 5: Investment in human capital development is positively related to the 
subsidiary’s human capital strength. 
 
 Figure 1 illustrates our theoretical model. 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
RESEARCH METHODS 
The Study Context 
The distinctive historical and economic connection between Hong Kong and Mainland China 
provides an appropriate research context for our study. Although China resumed sovereignty 
over Hong Kong on 1st July 1997, ‘socialist’ China and ‘capitalist’ Hong Kong have very 
different legal, regulatory and institutional systems (Chan, 2003; Datamonitor, 2008). These 
have grown over two centuries of being apart. Their different levels of economic 
development mean that resource availability, infrastructure and market efficiencies contrast 
significantly (Li et al., 2009). The ‘one country, two systems’ model put in place for the 
reunification (to continue for 50 years after the handover in 1997) perpetuate a complex set of 
institutions, and their accompanying historical, cultural, lingual, economic, legal and lifestyle 
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implications mean that institutional and resource differences persist between the two (Child 
et al., 2003; McKirdy, 2014).  
Sample and Procedure 
The target firms operate in Hong Kong and have business activities (subsidiaries) located 
across the border in Mainland China. No sampling frame containing the full population of 
target firms exists. So, the sample was drawn from the membership lists of four major 
business associations: the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, the Chinese 
Manufacturing Association of Hong Kong, the Federation of Hong Kong Business 
Association, and the Hong Kong Small and Medium Business Association. The subsidiaries 
are defined by the Hong Kong firms that have activities in China. Those firms owned by 
parents in other countries or Mainland Chinese firms were removed from the sample. The 
resulting sampling frame contained 2669 firms. 
Data collection consisted of a team of 7 trained researchers who visited all 
respondents to administer the questionnaire. All 2669 firms in the sampling frame were 
contacted by phone and asked to participate in the study. The process continued until the pool 
of willing interviewees was exhausted. The respondents were executives who were directly 
responsible for the management of their China business. Most of them were Hong Kong 
executives who were based in China, but required to travel frequently between Hong Kong 
and China. Interviews lasted approximately 90 minutes. The final response of 503 
respondents (one per firm) represented an 18.85% response rate. 
Of the 503 respondents, 377 were in manufacturing and 126 in services. Twenty three 
percent had less than 100 employees in Hong Kong and China, 15% had 100 to 199 
employees, 35% were medium-sized (200-1000 employees), and 27% were large companies 
with over 1000 employees in Hong Kong and China. It is impossible to say how this 
distribution of firms compares with the target population. However, it is reasonable to assume 
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that membership of the business associations is skewed towards larger firms and this possible 
bias should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. For example, there were 167 
companies that reported they had overseas employees and operations based in countries 
outside Hong Kong and China. Also, 295 companies reported that they had worldwide sales 
activities. Therefore, the survey results reflect a sizeable portion of Hong Kong firms who are 
engaged in international business activities in other parts of the world beyond China and 
Hong Kong. 
All measures were collected through the same questionnaire. The possibility of 
common method bias was tested using Harman’s one-factor test (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee 
and Podsakoff, 2003). A principal components factor analysis on all items yielded 7 factors 
with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. The results showed that several factors rather than one 
single factor were identified, and the first factor did not account for a majority of the variance 
(26%). We conducted a further test using the ‘single factor procedure’ recommended by 
Podsakoff et al. (2003). Goodness-of-fit statistics for the single factor model are shown in 
Table 3. The Goodness of-Fit Index (GFI) of 0.73 and Non-Normed Index (NNFI) of 0.28 
provide evidence that the single factor model does not fit the data well. The improved fit of 
the alternative and more complex model was statistically significant. Also, the correlation 
matrix (Table 1) indicates that the correlations are much higher inside the constructs than all 
other coefficients. This provides evidence of the discriminant validity of the constructs. 
These evidences suggest that the problems inherent in relying on single respondents are 
insignificant within the data.  
------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 To further test the validity and reliability of the study, the same survey was conducted 
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at a later stage with the same 503 previously-studied firms via phone calls, fax 
communications and emails. Only those companies who had local managers who were based 
in the China affiliate permanently and were responsible for the key business operations were 
invited for the same survey (intended as a different manager to the initial respondent). 
However, only 150 valid responses could be collected, partly since most of the key managers 
of the Chinese units were still the same managers interviewed at the previous stage. No 
significant differences were found from the main sample, demonstrating high consistency 
between the parent firm and the subsidiary in the responses to the questions answered. 
Questionnaire Development 
A draft questionnaire was developed to measure the variables in the hypotheses. Suitable 
measures were largely unavailable. New ones were therefore developed, informed by 
discussions in focus groups comprising 25 senior managers from Hong Kong firms active in 
China. All items were in non-simplified Chinese (Cantonese when spoken) and English. 
Translation and back-translation was used to ensure conceptual equivalence of the alternative 
versions (Brislin, 1970). All variables operating in the questionnaires were self-reported 
perceptual measures. This method is particularly suitable in studies related to organizational 
behaviour and intra-organizational knowledge processes (Foss, Minbaeva, Pedersen and 
Reinholt, 2009). 
To minimize the potential for common method bias, two methods were introduced at 
this design stage: (1) protecting respondent anonymity to reduce evaluation apprehension and 
(2) counterbalancing question order (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The first approach encourages 
respondents to answer honestly and reduces the potential for editing their responses because 
of social desirability, leniency and acquiescence. The second approach was achieved by 
carefully separating the question order of the predictor and criterion variables. The draft 
questionnaire was administered to a focus group of 15 executives, leading to some minor 
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amendments. The final version was piloted with a separate group of 50 senior managers. 
Measures 
Since the constructs in our model (Figure 2) are unobservable, they must be inferred from 
measured variables. Thus, a latent variable design with multiple indicators for each construct 
was chosen. This design allows constructs to be represented by a combination of variables 
that can be empirically measured. It also enables us to estimate construct measurement error 
(convergent and discriminant validity) in addition to error in the structural equations among 
constructs (unexplained variance). Most of the measures (apart from subsidiary performance) 
were developed taking into account the reflections from the managers’ experience through 
the focus group exercise and relevant literature. All these measures employ anchored 7-point 
scales. The constructs and their measurement items are shown in Table 2. 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Subsidiary Performance was assessed by three items from Venkatraman and 
Ramanujam (1986), previously used in English and Chinese by Child et al. (2003). These 
items measure managers’ subjective evaluations of their subsidiary’s success. These 
measures have been shown to positively associate with relevant objective measures (Beamish 
and Delios, 1997). 
 The independent variables were constructed from responses collected through the 
focus group study with 25 senior managers (providing content validity) and were fully 
represented in the relevant literature. Organizational control comprised four items measuring 
the extent to which the parent’s managers try to use various formal methods to control and 
motivate the behaviour of the people in their China activities. Following Grant’s (1996) 
concept of control, procedures, norms and rules must be set up strategically to provide 
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direction and incentives for knowledge processes.  
Transfer Success was examined by the extent to which the knowledge and skill of 
each function had been transferred successfully to China affiliates. We asked for the 
experience of the parent regarding the transfer of practice to the subsidiary in Mainland 
China to this end. Six areas of functional practices were originally included: accounting, 
operations, HRM, marketing, purchasing and technical standards. These emerged from our 
focus group of 25 senior managers from Hong Kong firms active in China (a cohort reflective 
of our main sample), and were present in the practice transfer literature (e.g., Björkman et al., 
2004; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Teece, 2014). Subsequent reliability and factor 
analysis revealed that operations, accounting and HRM practices had stronger internal 
consistency. The final analysis therefore used only the items of these three practices. 
Operating practices can form a capability allowing an organization to perform its activities 
with minimum resource wastage. Effective operating practices increase efficiency, reduce 
operating cost and are important for competitive advantage (Wu, Melnyk and Flynn, 2010). 
HRM practices can generate a high-performing working environment that offers a unique 
competitive advantage (Wright and McMahan, 1992), motivating its transfer from parent to 
subsidiary (Mellahi et al., 2013). Accounting practices can form an organizational capability 
for effective financial management. This enables better and more informed decision-making 
(Bierman and Smidt, 2003), superior evaluation of opportunities and strategic options (Slater, 
Reddy and Zwirlein, 1998) and improved management of employee performance (Otley, 
1999). The mean and standard deviation of operating (4.57; 1.67), accounting (4.07; 1.98) 
and HRM (4.25, 1.71) practices transferred indicate that transfer success was difficult to 
achieve. 
Human Capital Availability comprised two items assessing the extent to which 
managers were satisfied with the availability of competent managers and employees (as 
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human resources) for the China business. Human Capital Development was measured by two 
items assessing the extent to which managers were satisfied with the development of local 
managerial skills and local employee skills in China. From the focus group data, Hong Kong 
managers tend to divide their staff into two main types: general employees, taking mostly 
supporting functions such as routine administration and operations; and managerial staff, 
which are usually at more senior levels and take responsibility for managing key functions. 
Human Capital Strength contained three items measuring the degree of confidence the 
parent’s managers have in the competence of their Mainland Chinese staff at their work.  
Age, Size and Industry were selected as control variables as each can impact 
subsidiary performance. A younger subsidiary may not yet have established itself sufficiently 
in its new market or accumulated the resources needed to perform effectively. A smaller 
subsidiary may also face resourcing challenges. Industry may affect the performance of the 
subsidiary by being more or less turbulent and complex in comparison to others. 
Validity and Reliability of Measures 
Hypotheses were tested in an r/lavaan model, enabling us to form the underlying constructs 
(the measurement model) and to test the structural relationships among these constructs 
simultaneously. To confirm whether the constructs are internally coherent, three tests were 
used to check the convergent validity of the constructs (Table 2). These tests are based on the 
saturated measurement model in which all inter-factor correlations are specified (Jöreskog 
and Sörbom, 1993). First, a test for the strength of linearity: the R2 values of 0.40 or above 
exceed the normal threshold of 0.20 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black, 1995) and the z-
values for all items are highly significant and their standardized loadings are strong (above 
0.69). Second, a test for construct reliability: all six constructs score 0.79 or above, exceeding 
the threshold of 0.70 (Gerbing and Anderson, 1988). Third, a test for Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE) (Fornell and Larcker, 1981): the AVE statistics are all above 0.57, 
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exceeding the threshold of 0.50.  
Several measures of discriminant validity were also examined. We confirm that the 
correlations and casual paths between the latent variables are significantly different from 1 
when the confidence interval was set to 99.9% (Fornell and Larker, 1981). The square root of 
AVE is larger than the correlation with items belonging to other constructs (Table 1). The 
validity of the studied constructs are thus supported and the goodness-of-fit statistics for the 
whole measurement model (GFI= 0.93, NNFI=0.88) meets the requirements for accepting the 
model. 
The Goodness-of-Fit of the Structural Model 
To build the structural model we specified the causal relations to test the hypotheses. After 
repeated iterations, a final model generated by the r/lavaan analysis provides a coherent 
representation of the empirical data. To examine the nomological validity of the model, we 
draw on multiple indices of overall fit for structural equations (Bollen, 1989; Jöreskog and 
Sörbom, 1993). The theoretical and hypothesized model (model 3 in Table 3) has a chi-
square value of 431.46 (d.f. = 175) and a GFI based on residuals of 0.91. Both indices 
represent a good fit of the model to the data (Bollen, 1989). The NNFI value, indicating the 
proportion of improvement of fit relative to the null model when model parsimony is 
controlled, also provides a good fit of the model to the data (NNFI = 0.76). The root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA) of 0.05, exceeding the threshold of 0.08, further 
suggest the good fit of the proposed model to the data. 
A number of alternate specifications, including the saturated measurement model, 
were compared with the theoretical one (Table 3). By comparing the different models—using 
the parsimonious GFI of 0.62 and NFI of 0.81 (with adjustment for the higher degrees of 
freedom in the theoretical model)—the theoretical model has a better overall goodness-of-fit 
than the alternatives and therefore best represents the data. 
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RESULTS 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 AND TABLE 3 HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 2 shows the results of hypothesis testing. The relationship between transfer success 
and subsidiary performance (H1) is positive and significant (coefficient of 0.12, p<0.01). 
Hypothesis 3 relating human capital strength to performance is strongly supported (0.54, 
p<0.01). Control (H2) is positively associated with transfer success (0.62, p<0.01), and 
human capital availability (H4) and human capital development (H5) are positively related to 
human capital strength (0.35 and 0.47 respectively, both p<0.01). For our control variables, 
age, industry and size of Hong Kong-based staff show no effect on subsidiary performance 
while size of China-based staff has a small positive effect (0.15, p<0.01). 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Viewing subsidiary performance as a function of competing alternatives artificially distils 
parent firm investments into control and transfer oriented options versus the development of 
the subsidiary’s human capital resources. We overcome this by examining the effects of both 
of these important routes to subsidiary performance by integrating dual institutional and 
resource-based explanations for why a corporation might opt for transferring practice or for 
developing the human capital strength of its subsidiary. Our results offer a platform to better 
understand subsidiary performance. Several important findings are noted.  
 First, transfer success has a significant but somewhat small effect on subsidiary 
performance. Adopting an institutional explanation based on legitimacy may mask that from 
a resource-based perspective, the transfer of practices from the parent does not necessarily 
generate unique and defendable strengths that sufficiently augment subsidiary performance. 
The data indicates that the respondent firms had considerable variance along the items for the 
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‘transfer success’ construct. The average mean of 4.29 and average standard deviation of 1.78 
for the three practices (Table 1) suggest the firms had difficulty in transferring practices from 
the parent to the subsidiary. An explanation might be found in the idea of replication itself. 
The transfer of practice mimics but does not exactly replicate parent capabilities or the 
routines underpinning them, suggesting that the practices rarely exhibited the same fidelity as 
the originals. High fidelity can be thought of as an accurate and faithful replication or 
reproduction of the practice being transferred. A practice that is part-transferred or is an 
inaccurate or unfaithful replica of that of the parent’s would lack fidelity. Without fidelity, 
the value of the practice is potentially compromised because the routines and tacit knowledge 
underpinning the capability may have transferred incompletely. An investment in human 
capital can help the subsidiary overcome this deficit and increase subsidiary performance 
further.  
Second, the successful transfer of practice is strongly determined by control systems 
placed on the subsidiary by its parent. Such controls are based on performance targets, 
performance-based appraisals and rewards, formal systems, formal procedures and rules and 
detailed reporting. While the successful transfer of practice provides the subsidiary with 
legitimacy with its corporate parent, and offers it an opportunity to mimic best practices to 
develop its initial base of capabilities, the transfer might not fully replicate a parent’s 
capabilities owing to the tacit nature of the routines embedded in practices (Szulanski, 1996; 
Winter, 2003). Ideas, objects and practices rarely travel in complete forms. Information can 
be lost and lead a practice to mutate even if on the surface parts of its activities are 
successfully mimicked (Czarniawska and Sevón, 2005). 
Third, human capital strength depends on the human capital available to the 
subsidiary in its location and the extent to which the subsidiary is willing to invest in 
developing its human capital. From a theoretical perspective, this brings general human 
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capital with non-firm specific knowledge into the subsidiary to help it localize its activities 
and respond to local institutional pressures, while developing the strength of its firm-specific 
human capital to generate human resources capable of shaping new and context-specific 
outcomes for the subsidiary. This brings together both human capital types to explain 
whether defendable returns to subsidiary performance can occur and why. However, our 
observations are constrained by the fact that we do not yield insights into the conversion 
process; but we do put forward that the causal mechanisms are embedded in dual 
explanations from both institutional theory and the RBV. 
We offer two contributions to theory. First, our findings and discussion raise doubts 
about practice transfer as the sole means of encouraging a high-performing subsidiary. 
Internally transferred practices remain important, but novel advantages are more likely to 
emerge from human capital investments at the subsidiary level. We caution against 
comparing the effects of transfer success and human capital development with one another, 
however. Both are important routes to subsidiary performance offering legitimacy-seeking 
and advantage-seeking reasons for their adoption. A more direct approach might be to 
compare a practice imported from the parent to a similar practice developed by the 
subsidiary. This is difficult because one reason for resorting to practice transfer is to 
eliminate the duplication of effort by transferring an ostensibly powerful or established 
capability from the parent to the subsidiary (Szulanski, 1996). In the relentless pursuit of 
performance improvement, the subsidiary would avoid fashioning two practices for the same 
activity. The emergence of new, novel practices relies on human capital (Björkman and 
Budhwar, 2007; Peng, 2001) as its microfoundations (Felin et al., 2012; Mäkelä et al., 2012) 
and to ward off suffocating institutional pressure (Yang and Konrad, 2011). The contribution 
of human capital investments to subsidiary performance relies on the availability of local 
human capital to recruit as well as on its own initiatives to develop human capital. The 
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subsidiary must therefore bring together legitimacy-seeking behaviour and advantage-seeking 
behaviour.  
The transfer of practice research would benefit from adopting this dual perspective to 
best understand how successful transfer of practice can be achieved, particularly in terms of 
accurately replicating and duplicating routines underpinning practices rather than just 
mimicking the activity. There is an intriguing theoretical question here about whether 
successful transfer requires fidelity in comparison to the original resource or not. Institutional 
theory suggests that fidelity is needed for the subsidiary to gain legitimacy; the RBV suggests 
that any change in the practice compromises its properties as a capability. Our contributions 
call for a new research agenda to examine the problem of fidelity in capability replication and 
practice transfer. 
Second, we sought to offer an empirical model that unpacked the contribution of 
human capital to subsidiary performance along with the transfer of practice. The human 
capital of the subsidiary offer a direct basis for performance by serving as critical resources 
capable of generating rare advantages and difficult-to-imitate (and erode) rents. Investing in 
human capital strength is to invest in the human assets capable of generating new and novel 
practices bespoke to the context of the subsidiary and to combat constrains to the search for 
new alternatives. Our findings show the merits of this in terms of returns to subsidiary 
performance. This suggests a need to account for a knowledge-based view of the parent-
subsidiary relationship to go with the RBV and institutional theory. In the knowledge-based 
view, knowledge is central to the development of organizational capabilities (Grant, 1996). 
But knowledge resides within human capital.  
Limitations and Future Research 
Some limitations constrain our contributions. First, future studies should examine control and 
human capital in greater detail than was possible in this paper. For example, we did not 
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explicitly examine what new practices may have come from the human capital of the 
subsidiary. We treated it as one part of the causal mechanism through which human capital 
affects subsidiary performance, explaining why subsidiaries would purposefully invest in 
developing human capital strength as opposed to just owning human capital resources. A 
microfoundations view might shed light on these issues (Felin et al., 2012). Second, the 
limitation of using perceptual measures might be replaced by other sources of data that 
capture our constructs objectively. This is not straightforward. Determining objective proxies 
for these ‘soft’ constructs is difficult and scholars should be mindful of measurement malaise 
(Ketchen, Ireland and Baker, 2013). It would also be desirable to collect data at both the 
parent and subsidiary simultaneously. Our wider survey captured some of this and we 
considered controlling for whether the transfer of a practice was a parental policy or not. We 
chose not to because the institutional environment could have informed a transfer effort 
beyond parental policy. Third, a longitudinal research design might benefit investigations 
surrounding the successful transfer of practices and human capital development. Such 
research could also investigate whether dynamic capabilities protect against the erosion of 
advantage from parent or subsidiary capabilities over time (Teece, 2014). Insights from 
internalization theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1982; Hymer, 1976; Rugman, 
1981) could also contribute towards understanding these issues. Space limitations do not 
permit a full evaluation of the contribution of internalization theory to our research question. 
Future studies incorporating insights from internalization theory are warranted. Finally, the 
estimated model is based on Hong Kong firms in the China market context. The extent to 
which the results can be generalized to other contexts needs to be investigated before wider 
conclusions can be drawn. 
Future research would benefit from a focus on both parent and subsidiary as co-
developers of competitive advantage and subsidiary performance (see also Edwards, 
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Sanchez-Mangas, Bélanger and McDonnell, 2015). The diffusion of knowledge, routines and 
practices to set in place an initial set of capabilities for the subsidiary is important but needs 
to be matched with strategic initiatives supporting human capital strength at the subsidiary 
level. Such studies could examine the causal effect between human capital and the emergence 
of new practices. Also, our parsimonious model treats practices (and capabilities) as 
developing in the headquarters and then transferred to a subsidiary. But in geocentric and 
polycentric types of organizations, practice development may happen in collaboration with 
different entities and the subsidiary may have taken part in the development of knowledge 
about a practice, the practice itself, adapted the transfer of a practice on purpose, or reverse 
transferred practices to its parent. An extension would be to examine the effects of specific 
managerial actions in both parent and subsidiary on knowledge transfer when transferring 
practices. Thus suggests a need to integrate insights from the knowledge-based view along 
with those from the RBV and institutional theory to better understand the parent-subsidiary-
performance relationship. Under knowledge-based theory, the role of the organization is to 
create, store and deploy knowledge. How human capital act as integrators of knowledge 
might be important to resolving the practice transfer problem.  
An expanded focus on the composition of subsidiary human capital is also warranted. 
Expatriates at the subsidiary could be important facilitators of the transfer of practice and 
carry with them a degree of residual legitimacy if they were previously employed within the 
parent firm. Expatriates might therefore be a contingency factor relevant to our model. An 
examination of this issue could also go beyond expatriates to account for different forms of 
talent within the global talent portfolio of the MNC―such as corporate, subsidiary, 
international and local talents (Morris, Snell and Björkman, 2015).  
Research in strategy and management science would benefit from developing further 
the notion of fidelity in the context of practice (or capability) transfer. There may be 
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instances when adaptation is necessary for success (Jensen and Szulanski, 2004). 
Theoretically, this sits awkwardly with the idea of an institutional duality and implies a 
resource imperative as a way of reconciling institutional tensions. Nevertheless, future studies 
must embrace the implication that practices transfer in incomplete ways. One reason might be 
due to the incomplete transfer of the tacit knowledge and routines underpinning practices. 
Control and trust building are managerial actions relevant to knowledge transfer efforts. 
Problems with the value and fidelity of practices transferred might also be due to a lack of fit 
with the institutional environment of the subsidiary. Our study design partially controls for 
this by studying transfer success and entry by a set of firms from only one origin (Hong 
Kong) to only one destination (Mainland China). These are important new directions for 
future research. 
Conclusion 
Addressing repeated calls from international business and strategy scholars to integrate 
insights from institutional and resource-based views, this study answers the question, ‘to 
what extent do transfer of practice and developing human capital strength explain subsidiary 
performance?’ The variance in transfer success reported by our respondents indicates that 
while valuable, rare and difficult-to-imitate resources exist within MNC parents potentially of 
value to its subsidiaries, unless we collectively identify the means to successfully transfer 
those practices, their relative inimitability stretches not only to competitors but also to the 
MNC’s own subsidiaries. Transfer success rendered a positive but smaller contribution to 
subsidiary performance than might be hoped. A subsidiary can use human capital strategies 
as a further pathway to superior performance. While we move forward knowledge on 
subsidiary performance, the integration of insights from institutional theory and the RBV can 
advance the field and management practice yet further. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical Model 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Empirical Model 
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Table 1. Correlation Matrix (N = 615) 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21 
1. Setting performance 
targets 
0.67                                         
2. Use performance-
related rewards, 
appraisals 
0.67 *** 0.67                                       
3. Use formal systems, 
procedures and rules 
0.73 *** 0.64 *** 0.67                                     
4. Detailed reporting 
on operations 
0.64 *** 0.59 *** 0.67 *** 0.67                                   
5. Transferring 
operating practices 
0.31 *** 0.33 *** 0.31 *** 0.35 *** 0.80                                 
6. Transferring 
accounting practices 
0.35 *** 0.33 *** 0.30 *** 0.31 *** 0.57 *** 0.80                               
7. Transferring HRM 
practices 
0.30 *** 0.34 *** 0.33 *** 0.34 *** 0.75 *** 0.54 *** 0.80                             
8. Competent 
employees available 
0.10 ** 0.06  0.09 ** 0.03  0.12 *** 0.08 ** 0.13 *** 0.85                           
9. Competent 
managers available 
0.01  0.07  0.00  -0.03  0.11 ** 0.03  0.16 *** 0.69 *** 0.85                         
10. Development of 
local managerial 
skills 
0.10 ** 0.12 *** 0.08 * 0.10 ** 0.20 *** 0.18 *** 0.22 *** 0.43 *** 0.50 *** 0.73                       
11. Development of 
local employee skills 
0.13 *** 0.09 ** 0.08 * 0.07 * 0.22 *** 0.20 *** 0.24 *** 0.51 *** 0.44 *** 0.74 *** 0.73                     
12. Staff will always do 
a good job 
0.02  0.06  0.03  0.04  0.06  0.09 ** 0.10 ** 0.46 *** 0.47 *** 0.47 *** 0.51 *** 0.68                   
13. Can trust our staff 0.05  0.05  0.04  0.05  0.10 ** 0.09 ** 0.12 *** 0.41 *** 0.44 *** 0.44 *** 0.45 *** 0.63 *** 0.68                 
14. Can delegate to our 
staff 
0.07 * 0.08 ** 0.04  0.05  0.11 ** 0.08 ** 0.10 ** 0.38 *** 0.46 *** 0.50 *** 0.46 *** 0.72 *** 0.67 *** 0.68               
15. Success in meeting 
strategic objectives 
0.16 *** 0.17 *** 0.12 *** 0.19 *** 0.15 *** 0.20 *** 0.18 *** 0.30 *** 0.27 *** 0.41 *** 0.37 *** 0.38 *** 0.37 *** 0.37 *** 0.56             
16. Satisfaction with 
performance 
0.15 *** 0.16 *** 0.12 *** 0.14 *** 0.14 *** 0.12 *** 0.17 *** 0.29 *** 0.29 *** 0.39 *** 0.38 *** 0.40 *** 0.38 *** 0.35 *** 0.71 *** 0.56           
17. Satisfaction 
compared to 
competitors 
0.17 *** 0.15 *** 0.13 *** 0.16 *** 0.20 *** 0.17 *** 0.19 *** 0.24 *** 0.22 *** 0.29 *** 0.32 *** 0.33 *** 0.33 *** 0.30 *** 0.65 *** 0.63 *** 0.56         
18. Age -0.06  -0.05  -0.10 ** -0.11 ** -0.08 ** -0.01  -0.06  0.03  -0.01  -0.02  0.02  0.04  0.05  -0.01  0.03  0.05  0.06         
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19. Sector 0.06  0.15 *** 0.11 *** 0.10 ** 0.08 ** -0.02  0.08 ** -0.02  0.08 * 0.08 * 0.02  0.00  -0.04  0.02  0.06  0.08 ** -0.01  -0.12 ***      
20. Staff China 0.23 *** 0.27 *** 0.23 *** 0.21 *** 0.27 *** 0.23 *** 0.26 *** 0.07 * 0.06  0.13 *** 0.11 ** 0.04  0.01  0.02  0.15 *** 0.16 *** 0.15 *** 0.10 ** 0.32 ***    
21. Staff HK 0.08 ** -0.02  0.01  0.01  0.08 * 0.19 *** 0.07 * 0.00  -0.05  -0.01  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.00  0.06  0.02  0.07 * 0.29 *** -0.34 *** 0.23 ***  
Mean 5.02  5.00  5.40  4.96  4.57  4.07  4.25  4.39  4.15  4.50  4.63  4.30  4.35  4.19  4.37  4.36  4.55  16.16 0.7
 
  2.14  1.62 
Std. Dev. 1.67  1.69  1.59  1.63  1.67  1.98  1.71  1.04  1.20  1.07  1.00  1.15  1.24  1.29  1.15  1.14  1.10  13.72 0.4
 
  0.99  0.85 
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Note: Diagonal is square root of AVE.  
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Table 2. Constructs and Items 
 
Construct and Items 
 
 
Factor 
Loading 
 
 
 
z-value 
 
 
 
R2 Value 
 
 
Construct 
Reliability 
Average 
Variance 
Extracted 
(AVE) 
 
Organizational Control 
    
0.89 
 
0.67 
Setting performance targets 0.89  0.76   
Use performance-based rewards, appraisal 0.74 20.58 0.55   
Use formal systems, procedures and rules 0.87 22.81 0.76   
Detailed reporting on operations 0.76 22.40 0.58   
 
Transfer Success 
    
0.89 
 
0.80 
We have succeeded in transferring operating practices 0.80  0.63   
We have succeeded in transferring accounting practices 0.64 16.67 0.41   
We have succeeded in transferring HRM practices 0.79 19.21 0.63   
 
Human Capital Availability 
    
0.92 
 
0.85 
Competent employees available 0.90  0.82   
Competent managers available 0.89 23.31 0.79   
 
Human Capital Development 
    
0.89 
 
0.73 
Development of local managerial skills in China 0.95  0.90   
Development of local employee skills in China 0.89 29.99 0.79   
 
Human Capital Strength 
    
0.86 
 
0.68 
We know that the Mainland staff will always do a good 
job 
0.88  0.77   
We can trust out Mainland staff not to let us down 0.82 25.85 0.67   
We can confidently delegate to our Mainland staff 0.86 30.37 0.75   
 
Subsidiary Performance 
    
0.79 
 
0.56 
Success in meeting the strategic objectives for our 
activities in China 
0.90  0.80   
Satisfaction with the performance of our activities in 
China 
0.84 23.87 0.70   
Satisfaction with the performance of our activities in 
China when compared with our competitors 
0.72 17.01 0.52   
 
 
 
Table 3. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Two Competing Specification of the Model 
 
 
0 
Single Factor 
Model 
1 
Measurement 
Model (CFA) 
2 
Saturated Model 
3 
Theoretical Model 
Chi-square (d.f.) 711.04 
(119 d.f.) 
192.73 
(104 d.f.) 
222.72 
(108 d.f.) 
431.46 
(175 d.f.) 
GFI 0.73 0.93 0.91 0.91 
GFI adjusted for d.f. 0.65 0.89 0.88 0.88 
Parsimonious GFI 0.57 0.63 0.65 0.69 
RMSEA 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.05 
Comparative fit index 0.37 0.91 0.88 0.80 
NNFI 0.28 0.88 0.85 0.76 
Parsimonious NFI 0.30 0.63 0.63 0.60 
Note: Saturated Model has Control, Human Capital Availability and Human Capital Development each linked 
to Transfer Success and Human Capital Strength. 
 
